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Science and International Relations, Istanbul S¸ehir University, Istanbul, Turkey; †Department of
Political Science, Binghamton University, SUNY, Binghamton, NY, USA
ABSTRACT Using original public-opinion polls and elite interviews conducted in 2012, this
article analyzes the perceptions of Turkish foreign policy regarding the Arab Uprisings and the
Syrian conflict in three Middle Eastern countries, Egypt, Iraq and Iran. It finds that ethnic, sec-
tarian and religious groups in these three countries vary significantly in their views on Turkish
foreign policy regarding both the Arab Uprisings and the Syrian conflict, although the same
identity-related factors have a less salient effect at the elite level. The findings also suggest
that the intersection of ethnicity and sect shapes people’s attitudes toward Turkish foreign
policy in Iran and Iraq. Sunnis, except for Kurds in Iran and Iraq, tend to have a positive
view of Turkish foreign policy, while Shia Turkomans in Iraq tend to have a negative one.
The Arab Uprisings and their aftermath have had a significant effect on the foreign
policies of countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Particularly
important has been the effect on the foreign policy of Turkey, which has been actively
involved in the region, especially since the early 2000s. Much like the period in the
1980s under then prime minister Turgut O¨zal, who promoted export-oriented pol-
icies, Justice and Development Party (JDP) governments in the 2000s have
pursued close relations with neighboring countries. The policies of the JDP in the
Middle East have marked the beginning of a new era, though these policies do not
mark a complete rupture with the West.1
With the JDP in power, Turkey has intensified its policy of political, economic and
cultural engagement with the region, and “zero problems with neighbors” became the
motto of Turkish foreign policy. Ankara signed several high-level cooperation and
strategic partnership agreements with its Arab neighbors in political, economic and
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cultural domains, enhanced its role in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
and strengthened relations with the Arab League. It has created new institutions,
such as the Office of Public Diplomacy, and upgraded the activities of the Turkish
Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TI˙KA) in neighboring regions and
beyond.2 While this policy became a keystone of Turkish foreign policy, the Arab
Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and then Syria affected Turkey’s position, as a
result of which Turkey has had to recalibrate its policy toward the region.3 Turkey
itself has undergone a political and economic transformation throughout the last
decade, and Turkish political elites have viewed the democratic demands in the
MENA as positive developments. Consequently, Turkey has tried to side with the
demands for political change and reform, which has brought another wave of
changes in its foreign policy toward the region.4
The regime changes have created new political and economic opportunities for
Turkey, but the danger of widespread conflict in the region has also brought new chal-
lenges. Academics, media analysts and politicians have raised concerns that sectarian
conflict and clashes in Syria could threaten regional stability.5 Social and political
cleavages within and across countries as a result of ethnic and sectarian differences
are limiting the room for maneuver for any actor in the region and creating difficulties
for the foreign-policy-makers.6
Despite the importance of these cleavages, we do not know the extent to which
they are shaping public opinion or the attitudes of political, social and economic
elites in the region toward Turkey and its foreign policy. In this study, we investigate
how different ethnic, religious and sectarian groups in three MENA countries, namely
Egypt, Iran and Iraq, vary in their assessment toward Turkish foreign policy. For that
purpose, we conducted an extensive public-opinion poll and carried out elite inter-
views7 in 2012 to discover the differences in views between the public and elites.8
We find that ethnic, sectarian and religious groups vary in their attitudes toward
Turkish foreign policy. Ethnic, sectarian and religious affiliations shape the way indi-
viduals view Turkish foreign policy. Our findings also suggest that ethnic and sectar-
ian identities moderate each other’s effect on attitudes toward Turkish foreign policy:
Sunnis, except for Kurds in Iran and Iraq, tend to have a positive view toward Turkish
foreign policy regarding the Arab Uprisings and the Syrian crisis, whereas Shia
Persians and Azeris in Iran and Shia Turkomans in Iraq tend to have a negative
one. Our study also highlights the absence of diversity in views toward Turkish
foreign policy at the elite level in these countries and suggests that elites who do
not display the diversity in the population develop attitudes toward Turkey marked
by suspicion.
Recent Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East: Change or
Continuity?
Before discussing the perceptions of the public and elites toward Turkish foreign
policy in these three countries, it is essential to discuss Turkish foreign policy regard-
ing the Arab Uprisings. The general aims of Turkish foreign policy under JDP
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governments have been defined by former Prime Minister (now President) Recep
Tayyip Erdog˘an and former Foreign Minister (now Prime Minister) Ahmet Davuto-
g˘lu as follows: normalization of relations and rapprochement with Iraq and Syria,9 a
better political and economic relationship with Arab and non-Arab countries such as
Iran, and to contribute to the solution of regional conflicts as an active third party.10
A new page was turned in Turkish–Syrian relations after the death of Hafez Assad
in 2000, and the rapprochement with Syria that started after the 1998 O¨calan crisis
between the two countries continued under JDP governments until the Arab Upris-
ings.11 Apart from domestic factors in both countries, global and regional systemic
factors pushed these two countries into a closer relationship with each other.12
During this period, Turkey and Syria had their best relations in political, economic
and societal terms in recent history.13
Until the Syrian crisis, Turkish foreign policy was regarded positively by many
people in the region, and as something to be emulated by other states.14 This is
mainly true for ordinary citizens with different political backgrounds, but less so
for elites or statesmen.15 Just before the Arab Uprisings and in the early days of
the protests, the Turkish approach to economic and democratic reforms was men-
tioned in academic circles as an appropriate recipe for problems in transition countries
in the MENA,16 although some claimed that it was difficult to transfer the Turkish
experience of political reforms to the “Arab World.”17 The idea that there was
such a thing as a “Turkish model” was voiced not only by the United States, but
also by the European Union, Turkey and public opinion in the Middle East itself.18
Different countries and different actors in these countries found different aspects of
Turkish foreign policy of interest.19
Although there are several reasons for the portrayal of the Turkish political struc-
ture as a “model” for Middle Eastern countries, in this article we will analyze Turkish
foreign policy and the image of Turkey under JDP governments. Turkish policy
toward the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a turning point in perceptions of
its foreign policy in the region.20 For many people, Turkey’s refusal to allow the
transfer of US soldiers across Turkey to Iraqi territory was an unexpected but
welcome stance. From that point on, as Yuvacı and Kaplan have shown in their
research on Turkey’s voting pattern in UN General Assembly resolutions, Turkey
slowly deviated from its former alliance structures on other issues as well, and it
tried to develop independent foreign-policy preferences.21 Recent studies have
shown that Turkish foreign policy has increasingly used the tools of soft power in
its engagement with the region, which has contributed to an improved image of
the country in the Middle East.22
Turkey’s new stance can also be observed in its attitude toward the Palestinian–
Israeli conflict. Turkey’s increasing distance from Israel in the 2000s, and its vocal
support for the Palestinians, was an important change that has had a direct impact
on the perceptions of the country in the Middle East.23 We can also add the
change in Turkish foreign policy toward Syria and Iran in the 2000s, when these
countries were described by the US Administration of the time as members of the
“axis of evil.”24 Turkish and Iranian interests in some cases overlapped in regional
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politics after the US-led invasion of Iraq. But there have also been several differences
between Turkey and Iran on regional and international issues. For example, Iran has
not been happy with Turkey’s mediation and the rise of its soft power in the region.25
Some cases, such as the developments after the Arab Uprisings, have become a test
case for Turkey and its image. Some critics have argued that, after the Arab Upris-
ings, “Turkey’s ambition to play a major independent role has been compromised;
in fact, a learning process for Turkish diplomacy has been initiated.”26 According
to these studies, the limits of Turkey’s ability to influence regional developments
and to undertake a leadership role have become clearer.
Public Opinion and Turkish Foreign Policy
Given the claims for and against Turkey’s increasing activism in the Middle East
before and after the Arab Uprisings, the perception of Turkey’s policies in the
region needs to be determined empirically. Moreover, the foreign-policy views of
the public in the targeted countries are crucial for the policy outcomes of any
country.27 The public’s knowledge of foreign-policy issues is increasing and its pre-
ferences and expectations are becoming important for accountable governments. We
should also underline the fact that not all foreign-policy issues are salient, and this is
also true for many public policy issues. That is why we have chosen the most salient
foreign-policy issues in the region. The different responses toward the Arab Uprisings
and the Syrian crisis on the part of the population in general and of ethnic, sectarian
and religious groups in particular make it possible to make a distinct assessment of
each foreign-policy issue.
To the best of our knowledge, all the studies on attitudes toward Turkish foreign
policy have investigated Turkish citizens’ attitude toward Turkish foreign policy.
The Pew Global Attitudes Program (GAP), the German Martial Fund’s (GMF) Trans-
atlantic Trends Survey, Kadir Has University’s Turkey’s Social and Political Trends
Research and the Turkish Foreign-Policy Public-Opinion Research are primary
examples of public-opinion research on foreign policy or international politics.
Among those, the most cited surveys are Pew’s GAP28 and the GMF’s Transatlantic
Trends.29 These surveys are mostly focused on the attitudes of Turkish citizens or the
citizens of other countries toward US foreign policy. Except for TESEV’s Perception
of Turkey in the Middle East,30 none of these surveys have specifically investigated
how Turkish foreign policy is perceived by the public in the region. Even TESEV’s
studies are specifically interested in measuring attitudes toward Turkey, not toward
Turkish foreign policy regarding the Arab Uprisings or the Syrian conflict. Lastly,
the University of Maryland’s Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development has
conducted Arab public-opinion surveys for almost a decade (2003–11). However
those surveys include very limited information about Turkey and Turkish foreign
policy and overlook the impact of ethnic, sectarian and religious diversity on
public opinion.
We expect ethnic or religious identities, as well as the intersection of ethnicity,
sect and religion, to affect people’s perception of the foreign policy of other
198 M. O¨zcan et al.
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countries. This perception may be more positive in countries where the ruling elite
belongs to a particular ethnic or religious group, as with Shia elites in Iran, or the
minority Sunni elite in Iraq may tend to hold more positive attitudes toward a
Sunni neighboring country. A recent study on social identity and foreign policy
in Turkey has found that Turkish citizens with specific group identities, such as
being Kurdish or Muslim, tend to develop different attitudes toward Turkish
foreign policy.31
Our study builds upon these studies but differs from them in several important
respects. Our main contribution is that we examine the extent to which these three
identities and the intersection between ethnicity and sect affect attitudes toward
Turkish foreign policy in three countries. We investigate how citizens of Egypt,
Iraq and Iran assess Turkish foreign policy on three particular issues. Moreover,
except for Çiftc¸i’s (“Social Identity”) work on perceptions toward Turkish foreign
policy in Turkey, no other study has examined the impact of social identity on
foreign-policy perceptions in the Middle East. In this respect, our study is unique
in that it tests the impact of social identity on the perception of Turkish foreign
policy in other countries. Finally, we examine the perceptions of elites in these
countries toward Turkish foreign policy and the extent to which they differ from
the perceptions of the general public.
Analyzing Perceptions Toward Turkey in the Middle East
Taking the positive and negative evaluations of Turkey and its foreign policy into
account, this section analyzes the perception of Turkish foreign policy during the
Arab Uprisings. In order to acquire this information, we designed original surveys
for around 1100 respondents each in Egypt, Iraq and Iran. Public-opinion surveys
in non-democratic contexts, including the Middle East, are not new.32 The reliability
and validity of the questions in these surveys depend on whether researchers use
questions that are politically sensitive (e.g. specific questions regarding the leader,
the military and so on) or non- or less-sensitive questions (e.g. demographic questions
or questions that tend to be of a general nature, such as attitudes toward democracy or
questions such as ours on foreign policy); whether the regime is highly repressive or
not; and whether an independent polling agency or a state polling agency runs the
survey.33 For our research, the post-Arab Uprising period that created a more demo-
cratic environment, especially in Egypt, and the less-sensitive nature of our questions
increased the reliability and validity of our questions. At the time that the surveys
were conducted, the major problem was the access to the regions of Iraq that faced
security problems, which was overcome by conducting phone interviews in non-
Kurdish parts of the country. Moreover, given that ethnic and religious identities
are salient in countries where such identities are accepted but are not necessarily
fully incorporated into the regime, our respondents were not reticent to answer our
questions. In addition, we conducted interviews with social, political and economic
elites in these three countries. Below, we will explain briefly these public-opinion
surveys and go on with the elite interviews.34
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The Egyptian Public-Opinion Survey
The research in Egypt was conducted through the use of face-to-face surveys. We
employed stratified random sampling, which enabled us to survey religious minorities
that were heavily concentrated in some governorates and cities. First, we divided the
country into officially designated governorates for our sampling. Then we determined
urban and rural areas within each governorate. The next stage was to determine clus-
ters in each urban and rural area and then randomly choose clusters and households in
each cluster. Nevertheless, due to the difficulty in accessing remote areas, our survey
remained urban-biased. The sample size of our survey was 1100. However, with
missing observations (e.g. no response), the sample size decreased slightly,
varying according to the question. Our team trained surveyors and conducted pilot
studies to check the reliability of our questions.35 Having increased the reliability
of the questions, we ran the surveys between January 12 and January 25, 2012.
The Iraqi Public-Opinion Survey
The study’s Iraq leg was planned with face-to-face surveys in mind. Accordingly,
personnel employed by the survey company attempted to conduct face-to-face
surveys. One of the problems was that of transportation due to security problems.
Face-to-face surveys were completed in northern Iraq, where security did not pose
a threat to our teams. However, in other regions we turned to CATI (Computer-
Assisted Telephone Interviewing), using the equipment of a survey company with
trained Arabic and Kurdish surveyors. Calls were made by taking into account demo-
graphic factors, and predetermined quotas based on age and gender were used.
Because the calls were made by the random digit dialing (RDD) method, finding
people appropriate for the survey posed a significant challenge. Another important
problem was the refusal of women to participate in the survey. Female personnel
were employed to increase the number of female respondents. The original sample
size of the survey in this study was about 1000. The Iraq surveys began on September
28, 2012 and ended on December 2, 2012.
The Iranian Public-Opinion Survey
In the research’s Iranian leg, face-to-face surveys were attempted at first. While a pilot
survey was attempted by a group of administrators and academics, the structure of the
region and security problems caused the group to abort it. The research was con-
ducted via Persian-speaking Iranian personnel.36 As in Iraq, we employed the
CATI technique to create an approximate representation of the population in our
survey. The RDD method was again employed to increase the representativeness
of the sample.37 The above-mentioned difficulties led to a significant reduction in
some of the questions in our survey. For example, the two main questions that we
use in this study for Iran were responded to by around half of the respondents with
“no response” or “do not know.” As a result, we have responses from only around
200 M. O¨zcan et al.
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400 of 1100 respondents for these questions. For the Iran study, surveys began on
March 29 and ended on June 29, 2012.
Elite Interviews
For the elite interviews, we aimed to conduct interviews with political, economic, social
and academic elites. We tried to reach elites with different ideological, ethnic and pro-
fessional backgrounds. Consequently, we carried out interviews in the three countries
with politicians, academics, business people, state officials, journalists and researchers.
We conducted semi-structured interviews with a total of 48 elites in the three countries
so that we could compare our findings across these three countries. In selecting the
interviewees, we relied on the “snowball technique,” which helped us increase our
sample size in the politically sensitive environments of Iran, Iraq and Egypt. First,
we benefited from our local contacts in reaching out to interviewees, and then we
moved on to others following referrals from previous interviewees. However, we
should note that the ethnic, religious and sectarian diversity of these countries is not
reflected at the elite level. For example, Christians in Egypt and Sunnis in Iran and
Iraq are underrepresented in the central governments of these countries. This lack of
diversity has also had an impact on our findings at the elite level. For example, we
cannot say much about the attitudes of Sunni and/or Kurdish elites in Iran toward
Turkey. The exclusivist character of these states along ethnic, sectarian and religious
lines creates elites that represent the major dominant group in the country.
Therefore, despite the fact that we have tried to incorporate elites from different
ethnic, political and professional backgrounds, we cannot claim that we have been
completely successful. These interviews provided us with important insights regard-
ing the perceptions of elites, but also, indirectly, of the public. Since elite interviews
were conducted with a small number of people, we do not make any generalizable
claims regarding all elites in a given country.
The questions we asked on foreign policy in each of these countries were about
their assessment of Turkish foreign policy in three specific areas: the Arab Uprisings,
the Syrian conflict and the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. By doing so, we aimed to
compare the findings from the public-opinion surveys with those from our interviews
with elites.
Perceptions of Turkish Foreign Policy in Egypt
Public Opinion
We asked the respondents the following question:
How would you evaluate the approach of Turkish political leaders to the
political developments in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, or briefly to the Arab
Spring? Please respond on a scale where “1” corresponds to “Strongly
negative” and “5” corresponds to “Strongly positive.”
Assessments of Turkish Foreign Policy 201
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Table 1 displays the results in terms of percentage, which suggests that the Egyptian
public is generally supportive of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. While the
percentage of those who view Turkish policies toward the Arab Spring positively is
39.2 percent, the negative attitude is only about 16.1 percent. Even if we merge the
partially positive with the positive category, the overall result clearly shows that the
Egyptian public clearly has a positive perception of Turkish policies. We should also
note that 8.5 percent of the respondents did not respond to our question and 13.7
percent answered that they did not know.
This positive perception of Turkey may derive from a couple of factors. First, in
contrast to other countries in the region and the USA, Turkey’s reaction to the
Arab Uprisings was unequivocal. Before the Arab Uprisings, Turkey had developed
strong relations with the region’s political leaders regardless of their democratic cre-
dentials. However, during the transitions in the region, Turkey moved from pro-
regime policies to pro-people policies; that is, it supported all the popular movements
for democracy. One may argue that this was because the Islamic-rooted JDP wanted
similar conservative political parties in government throughout the region. However,
it is fair to say that the popular movements were initially led by diverse groups not
strongly affiliated with any major political party or group. The Islamist movements
came onto the scene after these movements had proved their strength against the
regimes.38
Second, and in parallel with the first factor, Arab media, in particular Al Jazeera,
broadcasts on Turkey, and its stance on the Arab Uprisings increased Turkey’s popu-
larity across the region.39 Turkey was a vocal critic of Mubarak during the demon-
strations and provided different forms of aid and assistance to the interim
governments.40 Third, during the social upheaval, many commentators widely dis-
cussed the Turkish model as a new political model.41 Turkey has provided a third
model in the Middle East between authoritarianism and radicalism. This model is
also meant to achieve economic success, which reduces poverty and creates a
middle class in Arab countries.42
However, this positive perception varies according to respondents’ religious iden-
tity. Table 2 shows that while Muslims tended to have positive attitudes toward
Turkish foreign policy during the Arab Uprisings, Christians, mostly Copts, tended
Table 1. Egyptian Public Opinion on Turkish Foreign Policy Regarding the Arab Uprisings
Not positive
at all
(%)
Not
positive
(%)
Partially
positive
(%)
Positive
(%)
Very
positive
(%)
No
response
(%)
Do not
know
(%)
6.5 9.6 22.4 24.6 14.6 8.5 13.7
Note: The question was “How would you evaluate the approach of Turkish political leaders to
the developments in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, or briefly to the Arab Spring? Please respond on
a scale where ‘1’ corresponds to ‘Strongly negative’ and ‘5’ corresponds to ‘Strongly
positive’.” N ¼ 846.
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to have less positive attitudes. Christians are slightly more critical of Turkish policy,
26.6 percent versus 20.3 percent. Furthermore, 51.5 percent of Muslims had a posi-
tive attitude, compared to only 35.6 percent of Christians. Although there was signifi-
cant support for Turkish foreign policy during the Arab Uprisings, the divide across
religious identities was significant.
We see a similar result regarding the other foreign-policy issue. For the sake of
space, we will not display the results for the whole country and will instead show
them by religious denomination. The respondents were asked: “How would you
evaluate Turkish foreign policy regarding the Syrian regime? Please respond on
a scale where ‘1’ corresponds to ‘I definitely do not approve/agree’ and ‘5’ corre-
sponds to ‘I definitely approve/agree.’” Table 3 shows that the disapproval of
Turkish foreign policy toward Syria is about 50.7 percent among Christians,
while the approval for the same group is only 16.9 percent. In contrast, for
Muslims the disapproval rate is 25 percent, which is far behind the approval rate
of 49.3 percent.
Table 2. Egyptian Public Opinion on Turkish Foreign Policy Regarding the Arab Uprisings by
Religious Adherence
Identity
Not positive
at all
(%)
Not
positive
(%)
Partially
positive
(%)
Positive
(%)
Very
positive
(%)
Religious Christian
(mean ¼ 3.0)
13.3 23.3 37.8 25.6 10
Muslim
(mean ¼ 3.3)
7.8 12.5 28.2 31.5 20
Note: The same question as in Table 1. N ¼ 701. The numbers do not round up to 100 percent
due to “no response” and “do not know” categories (not shown here).
Table 3. Egyptian Public Opinion on Turkish Foreign Policy Regarding Syria by Religious
Adherence
Identity
Not positive
at all
(%)
Not
positive
(%)
Partially
positive
(%)
Positive
(%)
Very
positive
(%)
Religious Christian
(mean ¼ 2.8)
5.6 45.1 32.4 15.5 1.4
Muslims
(mean ¼ 3.4)
8.7 16.3 25.7 28.8 20.5
Note: The question was “How would you evaluate Turkish foreign policy towards the Syrian
regime? Please respond on a scale where ‘1’ corresponds to ‘I definitely do not approve/agree’
and ‘5’ corresponds to ‘I definitely approve/agree’.” N ¼ 827. The numbers do not round up
to 100 percent due to “no response” and “do not know” categories (not shown here).
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The public-opinion data show a significant variation in attitudes toward Turkish
foreign policy regarding the Arab Uprisings and the Syrian conflict across religious
denominations. The mean difference between Christians and Muslims seems to be
smaller than we would have expected: 0.3. However, this is mostly due to the size
of the partially positive category, suggesting that Turkish policy toward the Arab
Uprisings was widely popular and was not, at the time of the survey, perceived
as negatively as was Turkey’s policy toward the Syrian conflict, where the mean
difference is 0.6. This result also suggests that Egyptians, whether Muslim or
Christian, can assess another country’s foreign-policy issues differently. What
about elites? Do they show a uniform approval or disapproval toward Turkey
and Turkish foreign policy?
The Views of Egyptian Elites
The perception among the general public is in line with perceptions among the elite.
In Egypt, there is a belief that Turkey is pursuing an active foreign policy in the
Middle East, and its image is generally positive in academic circles, in political
circles, among business people and among state officials. At the time of our field
work, our findings suggested that, especially in the last few years, Turkey is perceived
positively for two reasons: its help to the Palestinians and its opening toward Arab
countries.43 In explaining the recent Turkish opening toward the Middle East, an
Egyptian diplomat argued that Turkey turned toward the East and that the negative
atmosphere between Turkey and Europe played a role in Turkey’s decision. Although
Turkish foreign policy in the last few years is seen positively, according to an Egyp-
tian diplomat, its change in policy during the Libyan crisis is seen as opportunistic.44
Turkish policy toward the Palestinian issue is critical to elites’ positive image of
Turkey. In this respect, the scene from the Davos meeting in January 2009, Erdog˘an’s
storming off the debate, was in people’s minds. An Islamist Egyptian politician
argued that Turkey is becoming a very influential actor on the issue of Palestine,
but also that Egypt will play the main role in the future and Turkey only a secondary
role.45 Beside its attitude to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, some elites pointed to the
personalities of the policy-makers as the reason for the success of Turkey’s foreign
policy.
The elites interviewed in Egypt were generally positive about Turkey’s policy
toward Syria. We can say that supporting the change in Syria and Turkey’s attitude
toward Syrians escaping from violence are both highly appreciated by the Egyptian
people. However, it should be kept in mind that these elite interviews were conducted
before the military coup of July 3, 2013. We might expect some changes in the per-
ception of Turkey, given the differences between Turkey and the new Egyptian
administration after the coup. In particular, the Egyptian state and media have been
extremely critical toward Turkey since the coup, blaming Turkey for supporting
Morsi, the deposed president of Egypt. Most probably, the attitude toward Turkey
will be less positive now than it was in the period under consideration here, but reli-
gious identity continues to shape the way people perceive the country.
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Bureaucratic elites were more critical of Turkey. For example, an Egyptian diplo-
mat argued that Turkey has been acting with the West in the case of Syria in general.
The perception of Western countries among these elites is critical and negative
because of their support for Israel, which affects their perception of Turkey. The
same diplomat argued that Turkey is in the beginning stages of a paradigmatic
shift in its foreign policy.46
An Egyptian secular-liberal academic argued that Turkish foreign policy after the
Arab Uprisings has been positive, except in the case of Libya, where Turkey at first
seemed to side with the former Qaddafi regime.47 The image of Turkish foreign
policy changed after Davos, and the video of the Davos conference is very popular
in Egypt. People expect their own political leaders to act with dignity in foreign
policy.48 An Egyptian liberal academic argued that Turkish policy toward Syrians
escaping from violence has been very positive, and that “Turks, as half-brothers,
did better than the full-brother Arabs in hosting Syrians.”49
So we see that elites from different backgrounds, except for bureaucratic elites, are
generally positive regarding Turkish policy toward Syria. Regardless of their political
attitudes, support provided to the Syrian refugees has contributed positively to the
image of Turkey among these elites. The experience of revolution and change and
the predominantly Sunni Muslim background of these elites may be among the
factors contributing to this perception.
Perceptions of Turkish Foreign Policy in Iraq
Public Opinion
In Iraq, half of the Kurds have a negative perception of Turkey’s foreign policy in
the region. Understandably, this is mostly related to Turkey’s own Kurdish
problem and its implications for other countries in the region. Table 4 suggests
that Arabs have a more favorable perception than Kurds do toward Turkish
foreign policy, with only 12 percent of Arabs saying they have a negative percep-
tion of Turkish foreign policy. Interestingly, 33.4 percent of Turkomans inter-
viewed in Iraq have a negative perception of Turkey’s policies. Kurds, on the
other hand, perceive Turkish foreign policy highly negatively, at 66 percent.
Although there is also a very positive view among some segments of the Turkoman
community, the negative perception among Turkomans may be attributed to the
sectarian background of these people. Table 4 also shows substantial differences
in Sunnis’ and Shiites’ perceptions of Turkey. Some 24 percent of Sunnis view
Turkey negatively, versus 15.2 percent of Shiites. Sunnis have a slightly higher
positive attitude toward Turkey, at 47.9 percent, compared to 42.6 percent for
Shiites. Our further analysis suggests that the greater distrust toward Turkey
among Sunnis is a result of the views of Iraqi Kurds. We see that sectarian back-
ground, for example being a Sunni, does not automatically translate into a positive
view of Turkey, since important segments of Kurds have a negative view of the
country despite being Sunni.
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When we examine Table 5 for the Syrian crisis, we see that the mean scores for these
groups (Arabs, Turkomans, Sunni and Shia except for Kurds) are mostly lower, com-
pared to the Arab Spring mean scores. We also see that Kurds tend to have a higher rate
of disapproval toward Turkish policy on Syria. The Turkomans come second. This may
be due to the fact that Turkish governments’ struggle with Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) over the last 30 years has created a negative impression among Kurds in
Turkey, Iraq and other countries.50 Here again, we see the effect of the intersection
between religion and ethnicity on attitudes toward Turkey. The rate of disapproval
among Turkomans is noteworthy. It suggests that the Shia Turkoman population
assesses Turkish foreign policy consistently with other Shias, while Sunni Turkomans
do so consistently with other Sunnis. In sum, while ethnicity drives the results for
Kurds, sectarian identity has significant effect on Turkoman attitudes. Arabs seem to
have a higher approval rate for Turkey. Table 5 also discloses sectarian differences
toward Turkey. Understandably, Sunnis are more supportive of Turkish policy (47.1
percent), but the approval rate among Shiites is moderate (24.5 percent).
The Views of Iraqi Elites
Here we see a difference between elites and the public, since the public is more sup-
portive than elites. Shiite Arab elites criticize Turkey for being too close to Sunni
groups in the region, and Kurds criticize it for not being close enough to Kurds.
Among elites in these three countries, a fragmented picture emerges in Iraq, com-
pared to the nearly monolithic perceptions in Iran and Egypt. During the interviews,
it became obvious that there are serious differences between the various sects and eth-
nicities in Iraq in terms of their perception of Turkish foreign policy. Kurds are happy
with the opening toward the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) but critical of
operations against the PKK. Sunni Arabs are positive toward Turkey’s policy of
engagement and even expect Turkey to become more active to balance other actors
Table 4. Iraqi Public Opinion on Turkish Foreign Policy Regarding the Arab Uprisings by
Ethnicity and Sect
Identity
Not positive
at all
(%)
Not
positive
(%)
Partially
positive
(%)
Positive
(%)
Very
positive
(%)
Ethnic Arab (mean ¼ 3.8) 3.8 8.2 6.6 21.9 23.3
Kurd (mean ¼ 2.3) 43.8 11.7 0.8 8.6 15.6
Turkoman
(mean ¼ 3.1)
25.6 15.4 5.1 2.6 30.8
Sectarian Sunni (mean ¼ 3.5) 16.4 7.5 4.4 17.1 30.2
Shia (mean ¼ 3.6) 3.7 11.5 8.4 28.0 14.6
Note: The same question as in Table 1. N ¼ 650. The numbers do not round up to 100 percent
due to “no response” and “do not know” categories (not shown here).
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in the region. The general trend among the Shiite Arab elite is that Turkey played an
inclusive foreign policy before the Arab Uprisings but afterwards started to favor one
particular group. Bilateral difficulties between Turkey and Iraq, according to the same
group of people, are resulting from Turkey’s attitude. Here, their argument implies
that sectarian concerns have had an increasing impact on the making and implemen-
tation of Turkish foreign policy after the Arab Uprisings.
Iraqi Kurds from different political backgrounds are positive regarding the devel-
oping relations between Turkey and the KRG. Kurds with an Islamist background are
happy with Turkey’s distancing itself from Israel.51 At the same time, however, most
Iraqi Kurds stressed that Turkey should settle its own Kurdish problem in order to
become a powerful player in the region. As a result of the increasing role of
Turkey in the Middle East, Ankara’s prestige in Europe is also on the rise, according
to Kurds interviewed in Iraq.
Apart from the positive views regarding Turkey, there were also some criticisms
from some of the elites for various reasons, including Turkey’s perceived rivalry
with Iran, its handling of relations with Israel and the Turkish attitude toward other
Islamic groups in the Middle East.52 The differences between Turkey and Iran regard-
ing the political future of the Middle East and the perceived rivalry between the two
neighbors were also raised by Iraqi Kurdish and non-Kurdish elites.
Turkey’s relationship with the KRG is seen as an important transformation from
enmity to cooperation on several issues over the last few years. Turkey has increased
its engagement with Kurdish political figures in Iraq in the political and economic
domains.53 During the same period, Ankara’s relationship with Baghdad cooled
off because of the improved relationship between Ankara and Arbil, political devel-
opments in Iraq, including the case of Tariq Has¸imi,54 and differences on Syria and
other regional developments. During the autumn of 2013, a better relationship
between Ankara and Baghdad developed, with several bilateral visits and positive
signals from politicians. Domestic and regional factors have led the two sides to
try to ameliorate bilateral relations.
Table 5. Iraqi Public Opinion on Turkish Foreign Policy Regarding Syria by Ethnicity and Sect
Identity
Not positive
at all
(%)
Not
positive
(%)
Partially
positive
(%)
Positive
(%)
Very
positive
(%)
Ethnic Arab (mean ¼ 3.4) 9.6 10.1 9.5 14.1 22.4
Kurd (mean¼2.3) 44.5 15.6 3.1 5.5 16.4
Turkoman
(mean ¼ 2.3)
35.9 17.9 0.0 5.1 23.1
Sectarian Sunni (mean ¼ 3.4) 18.7 10.0 6.2 13.1 34.0
Shia (mean ¼ 2.8) 15.2 16.8 11.5 14.3 10.2
Note: The same question as in Table 3. N ¼ 663. The numbers do not round up to 100 percent
due to “no response” and “do not know” categories (not shown here).
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During the interviews, criticism of Turkey from Iraqi Shiites was mainly related to
Turkish support for some political groups and individuals in Iraq, including Tariq
Has¸imi. An Iraqi Kurdish politician from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also
argued that Turkey’s policy on the issue of Has¸imi showed its disregard toward dom-
estic sensitivities in Iraq.55
The editor of a newspaper in the KRG argued that Turkey is not a neutral actor in
regional conflicts:
Turkey was too closely aligned with Islamist groups during Arab Uprisings, but
these Islamist groups are not as rational as the JDP, and these groups will not be
able to solve the problems in their countries when they come to power.56
Similarly, an Iraqi Kurdish journalist claimed that Turkey has provided too much
support to (Sunni) Arabs, and that it should extend the same support to the
Kurdish opposition.
In a divided Iraq, sectarian differences have affected perceptions of Turkish foreign
policy after the Arab Uprisings. Sunni Arabs, as stated above, think that Turkish
policy regarding the Arab Uprisings was more positive than that of other states in
the region, and they believe that Turkey should be more involved in regional pro-
blems. Shiites in Iraq, in contrast, are more critical of Turkey, and there are simi-
larities between the arguments of Iranians and Iraqi Shiites. This can be expected,
given the polarizing nature of the growing conflict in Syria along sectarian lines
and the influence of Iran in some parts of Iraq. Kurds are critical of the Syrian
regime’s attitude toward its own people, but also argue that Turkey is too interven-
tionist in the case of Syria.
A senior politician from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq argued that Turkey
acted in a hurry in the case of Syria and that the Syrian opposition is insufficiently
inclusive, which poses a problem for Turkey.57 Another Shiite politician claimed
that Turkish policy is sectarian, and that Turkey is moving away from a balanced pos-
ition toward supporting a particular sect in its regional policy. An Iraqi Sunni diplo-
mat said that although the Syrian regime is a brutal one and should go, Turkish policy
on this issue is in line with the agenda of the Gulf countries.58
An Iraqi Kurdish journalist argued that Turkey’s policy is problematic, because it
supports only Arabs, and Kurds are not sufficiently represented in the opposition.59 A
senior figure from the Kurdistan Islamic Union Party said that Turkey should be
careful in Syria since the Syrian regime will use any opportunity to harm Turkey.
He compared Turkey’s policy toward Libya and Syria and argued that Turkey’s
policy toward the latter is problematic: “Qaddafi may not create problems for
Turkey, but Syria has some cards, and they can use these cards against Turkey.”60
In sum, the perception of Turkish foreign policy in Iraq is divided along ethnic and
sectarian lines. Apart from the multiethnic and sectarian nature of Iraq, the lack of
strong political parties/institutions in this country due to the former Ba’ath
regime’s legacy enhances the impact of ethnic and sectarian identities on people’s
interpretation of Turkish domestic and foreign policy.
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Perceptions of Turkish Foreign Policy in Iran
Public Opinion
The public-opinion survey in Iran was conducted when the relationship between Iran
and Turkey was strained as a result of differences over Syria and other regional
issues. Iran’s state security and intelligence services made it hard for researchers to
run their survey. Our phone surveys were conducted under such a tense political
environment that the number of no responses and “I do not knows” was quite
high. This reduced the number of responses to around 400, in contrast to our
surveys in Egypt and Iraq, which received between 850 and 1000 responses.61 The
main problem with this reduction in the response rate is that ethnic groups were
underrepresented in our sample. As a result, we are not able to present the distribution
of the responses by ethnic group. Table 6 shows the distribution of the responses by
sectarian affiliation. The results show that Sunnis in Iran tend to have a higher posi-
tive view toward Turkish foreign policy regarding the Arab Uprisings. Not surpris-
ingly, Shiites have a higher negative view. We suspect that the majority of Sunnis
who view Turkish foreign policy negatively (12.7 percent) are Kurds, as was con-
firmed by our diagnostic tests with the available Kurdish citizens in the survey.
Table 7 focuses on Turkish foreign policy toward Syria. Given that Iran and Ira-
nians have historical and religious ties to the Syrian regime, we would expect most
Shiites to be critical of Turkey. The findings confirm this expectation. More than
35 percent of Shiites disapprove of Turkish policy, while only 1.4 percent of
Sunnis do so. Around 34 percent of Shiites and 87.1 percent of Sunnis support
Turkish foreign policy. In addition, a comparison of the mean score for each sect
tells us how sectarianism affects people’s views, but the differences are less
marked regarding the Arab Uprisings. The mean score for Sunnis is much higher
for Syria (4.4) than for the Arab Uprisings (3.6). In contrast, Shiites’ mean score
for Syria (2.9) is much lower than for the Arab Uprisings (3.2). The divide over
Syria suggests that Sunnis and Shiites have completely different political attitudes,
including foreign-policy attitudes. Overall, this finding also shows that sectarian clea-
vages are important in determining how Turkish foreign policy is assessed.
Table 6. Iranian Public Opinion on Turkish Foreign Policy Regarding the Arab Uprisings by
Sect
Identity
Not positive
at all
(%)
Not
positive
(%)
Partially
positive
(%)
Positive
(%)
Very
positive
(%)
Sectarian Sunni (mean ¼ 3.6) 0.0 12.7 19.0 62.0 6.3
Shia (mean ¼ 3.2) 12.0 12.9 26.4 42.6 6.0
Note: The same question as in Table 1. N ¼ 422. The numbers do not round up to 100 percent
due to “no response” and “do not know” categories (not shown here).
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The Views of Iranian Elites
Elites in Iran generally agreed that Turkey has been pursuing an active and ambitious
foreign policy in the last few years, and they held a generally negative view of
Turkey, especially among those that are close to state structures. The image of
Turkey and Turkish foreign policy among businesspeople and independent figures
was more positive.
In Iran, the reasons for the activism in Turkish foreign policy are believed to be as
follows: the character of the policy-makers, the economic needs of the country and
the political and economic stability of the country. It is generally agreed that person-
alities play an important role here. Some people identify Turkish foreign policy with
Erdog˘an, but some others point to the vision of Ahmet Davutog˘lu.
In addition to the personalities of policy-makers and the Palestinian–Israeli conflict,
other factors that were mentioned as positively affecting the image of Turkish foreign
policy were Turkey’s efforts at mediation in the region and its efforts to promote regional
cooperation. In the last few years, regionalism has been the driving force in Turkey’s
foreign-policy agenda, and cooperation with Iran on economic, strategic and social
issues has been an important aspect of regionalism.62 An Iranian filmmaker defined
Turkish foreign policy as “realist and providing answers to current problems, and suc-
cessful, since Turkey avoids creating enemies.” A former Iranian MP said that “Turkey
acted successfully in mediation efforts, presented a different regional Islamic model and
acted properly against the tide of globalization.”63 Iranian academics working on Turkey
also said that Turkey’s efforts in mediating conflicts in the region can be credited partly
to then Foreign Minister Davutog˘lu’s personal inclination, but are mainly due to the lack
of effective mediation in the region.64 In analyzing Turkish foreign policy in the region,
academics argued that in the last few years Turkish diplomacy has been directed toward
the promotion of a multilateral settlement.65
An Iranian businessman and member of the Turkish–Iranian Business Council
argued that the most important success of Turkish foreign policy has been in attract-
ing foreign direct investment, as “businessmen from different parts of the world are
choosing Turkey, and this is a real success.”66
In contrast, an Iranian expert on foreign policy argued that Turkey’s most impor-
tant foreign-policy success in the last few years has been in developing relations with
Table 7. Iranian Public Opinion on Turkish Foreign Policy Regarding Syria by Sect
Identity
Not positive
at all
(%)
Not
positive
(%)
Partially
positive
(%)
Positive
(%)
Very
positive
(%)
Sectarian Sunni (mean ¼ 4.4) 1.4 0.0 11.4 31.4 55.7
Shia (mean ¼ 2.9) 16.5 19.1 30.1 26.2 8.1
Note: The same question as in Table 3. N ¼ 383. The numbers do not round up to 100 percent
due to “no response” and “do not know” categories (not shown here).
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Russia in the political, economic and cultural spheres, despite their differences on
Syria.67 Some experts at Iranian think tanks said that, over the last decade, Turkey
has focused on developing its economy, and as a result of this Turkey has tried to
develop relations with its neighbors.68 Promoting economic relations with regional
countries was assessed as a positive factor in the perception of Turkish foreign
policy at the time when we conducted our interviews.
There are clear sectarian differences in the perception of Turkish foreign policy in
Iran. Elites who are critical of Turkey and its foreign policy said that it is too early
to judge the success or failure of Turkey’s foreign policy. In the surveys, only a
very small number of people were interested in foreign-policy issues; in short, an
important segment of society does not have an interest in or knowledge of Turkish
foreign policy.
Iranian elites argued that Turkish foreign policy had been perceived positively until
three years ago, since it was seen as being in line with Iran’s regional policies. Some
of our interviewees saw this similarity as evidence of Turkey’s observance of the
“good example of the Iranian Revolution.” More recently, however, Turkey’s inde-
pendent approach and differences with Iran over regional politics have affected the
image of Turkish foreign policy in Iran negatively. The head of a research center
in Tehran argued that “Turkey stopped pursuing its ‘zero-problems policy’ and
started to act like a subcontractor of the US and NATO, and then its successes
came to an end.”69 Another criticism of Turkey is that Ankara has been unable to
achieve its desired results in some foreign-policy initiatives.
Similar to these criticisms, some other elites in Iran claimed that being opposed to
Iran in regional issues and not developing military relations with Tehran have been a
failure. According to these views, Turkey played a mediating role in the settlement of
disputes over the Iranian nuclear program but could not achieve what it wanted from
these mediation efforts.70 These types of arguments mainly came from state officials
and people close to the state ideology, whereas opposition figures in Iran perceived
Turkish foreign policy positively. Critics argued that Turkey’s stance toward
Egypt, Libya and Tunisia was different from that toward Yemen and Bahrain. An
Iranian researcher argued that Turkey’s current regional policy has similarities with
that of Algeria in North Africa in the past, and Algeria also acquired a good reputation
by pursuing a peaceful foreign policy in its region. He argued that such a policy may
enhance a state’s reputation, but it does not always produce the desired results.
The perception of Turkish policy toward Syria is clearly negative among most
elites interviewed. Among the few positive comments were those of an Iranian
writer, who argued that Turkey was an aspirational ideal during the Arab Uprisings,
and that its prestige and successes acted as a catalyst for them.71 One of the few
Iranian experts in international relations who views Turkey’s policy toward Syria
positively concurred, but he argued that Turkey should avoid differing with Iran.72
Among those with negative perceptions of Turkish foreign policy is an Iranian jour-
nalist, who argued that after the Arab Uprisings Turks acted in a hurry, as always, and
it was wrong to work on formulas that excluded Iran.73 Iranian elites’ criticisms of
Turkish foreign policy on this issue can be summarized as follows: Ankara is too
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interventionist, is too close to Muslim Brotherhood, is damaging the axis of resistance
(meaning Iran, Syria and Hezbollah), is opposing Iran in the case of Syria and does
not have the capacity to pursue such a foreign policy.
An expert on Turkey argued that Iran is indebted to Syria because of its support
during the Iran–Iraq War, and that Iran is very concerned with the instability that
may result from a transition there. As a result of their difference of opinion over
Syria, relations between Turkey and Iran are strained, and it is up to Turkey to ame-
liorate the bilateral relationship.74An Iranian academic said that Turkey has acted
rationally in Syria, which is good for Turkey. The problem with Turkey’s policy
toward Syria, however, is that it relies heavily on Western powers and also ignores
the possible demands of Syrian Kurds for autonomy.75
In sum, elites in Iran are suspicious of and critical toward Turkey. Turkish foreign
policy toward Syria is especially worrying for Iranian policy-makers because of the
importance of Syria to Iran’s national interest. Syria is seen as an important element in
Iran’s defense, and Turkey’s policy toward the country is perceived as a direct threat
to Iran’s position in regional politics. Only some figures from the business commu-
nity and academia differed from the general trend among Iranian elites. Here we see
the importance of one’s background in how one defines the national interest, and
therefore in the perception of Turkey’s policy toward Syria.
Conclusion
The Arab Uprisings have had very complicated and unsettling effects on the MENA
region. It is difficult to make judgments about the success of the foreign policies of
the various competing political actors in the region. Sweeping changes in the region
and increasing polarization within and across countries have created unstable political
environments in which regional and international actors find it difficult to formulate pol-
icies. We conducted our public-opinion surveys and field work during these dramatic
changes in the MENA—specifically before the July 3 (2013) military coup in Egypt,
when a relatively positive perception of Turkey predominated among both elites and
the public in that country. In comparison, Turkey’s relations with Iran and Iraq were
more negative during our field work. In the absence of any recent survey research, it
is difficult to assess to what extent our findings may have changed over time. Therefore,
we restrict our discussion to the period during which we conducted our research.
We would like to underline several important findings in our research. First, in all
of these countries the overall findings suggest that liberals and the business commu-
nity perceive Turkish foreign policy as successful, whereas state officials and people
close to state structures are more critical. Economic elites tend to view Turkey as a
role model and believe that economic cooperation between Turkey and their countries
will be mutually beneficial. This win-win mentality and the positive views toward
further regional collaboration is quite a solid finding, which may have the potential
of positively influencing more competitive spheres, such as geopolitics. Bureaucratic
elites, in contrast, are more skeptical of Turkey’s intentions and policies in the region.
This may not be surprising, given that their duty is to defend the national interest of
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their countries against other states. These elites are cautious about the popularity of
Turkey among the public and the national and international media. In our interviews,
bureaucratic elites did not hesitate to mention their concerns regarding Turkey’s acti-
vism in their zones of influence. These elites want to see Turkey as an ally against
their enemies rather than as a competitor in the regional struggle for influence.
Despite high-level strategic contacts and confidence-building measures at the elite
level, elites perceive ongoing policies in more competitive terms.
Second, our study’s major contribution is to add ethnic and sectarian dimensions to
previous studies on foreign policy and soft power. Apart from a few recent studies,76
there are no empirical academic studies that examine the soft power of alternative
actors from a comparative perspective. Previous studies on the MENA region, for
instance by Akgu¨n et al.,77 and Telhami,78 or the soft-power index by the Monocle
journal, have investigated the level of soft power by Turkey, the USA, China and
other countries. However, ethnic and religious dimensions were missing in these
studies. In sum, this study has contributed to the elaboration of ethnic and sectarian
factors in influencing the perception and evaluation of the policies of alternative pol-
itical actors from a comparative perspective.
We have shown that ethnic, sectarian and religious minorities vary in their percep-
tion of Turkey and its policies. The intersection of ethnicity and sect shapes people’s
attitudes toward Turkish foreign policy. In general, the public is more positive toward
Turkish foreign policy than elites in these three countries. Among the general public,
it is clear that sectarian and ethnic backgrounds influence perceptions of Turkey and
its foreign policy. However, we do not find the same diversity among elites,
especially in Iran and Egypt, and therefore we cannot say that these identity
factors shape their attitudes toward Turkish foreign policy as well. The underrepre-
sentation of Christians in Egypt and Sunnis and Kurds in Iran and to some extent
in Iraq at the elite level, and their underrepresentation in our elite interviews,
should caution the reader that our findings among the general public may not hold
among elites. For example, some Shiites in Iraq and Iran at the elite level blame
Turkey for supporting sectarian policies because of the political difficulties of
these countries with Turkey and the Syrian civil war. However, we cannot say
whether Sunni elites in Tehran share this view.
Moreover, our findings on public-opinion data show that Turkomans in Iraq are
divided in their perception of Turkey by their sectarian affiliation. Similarly,
Sunnis in Iran hold a positive attitude toward Turkey, with the exception of Kurds.
Our field work and the review of secondary works on Iraq suggested that continuing
conflicts in the region and daunting political and economic challenges in most of the
countries in the region are leading politicians and parties to resort to identity politics.
Finally, this study showed that these cleavages shape citizens’ attitudes toward the
foreign policy of another country. This presents a challenge to Turkish, Saudi, Amer-
ican or other countries’ foreign-policy-makers, as their messages and policies will be
filtered through ethnic and religious lenses. Public-opinion data provide strong evi-
dence for this argument, and the elite interviews show greater challenges for Turkish
foreign-policy-makers, given that ethnic and religious elites have stronger reservations
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about Turkish foreign policy. In this respect, our findings not only speak to the foreign-
policy literature, but also to the literature on soft power, which tends to dismiss ethnic,
sectarian and religious heterogeneity in a given country. Future studies on soft power
should incorporate these cleavages into their analysis.
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